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Abstract: Iran’s nuclear program has become the major dispute between the Islamic Republic and global powers, led by the United
States. This essay identifies the principal elements in any potential
agreement, and outlines the steps needed to enhance the opportunity for a successful negotiation. Rapprochement between Tehran and
Washington is not only possible, but indeed, desirable.

S

ince 1979, relations between the United States and Iran have
been characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility. The areas
of contention include human rights, the Arab-Israeli peace
process, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. In recent years few crises
have attracted the attention of the international community as much as
the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program. The claims and counterclaims by the Islamic Republic and its major rivals have pushed all sides
to the edge of a military conflict and a range of uncertain and unpredictable scenarios. Western powers, led by the United States, accuse Iran of
seeking to build nuclear weapons and Tehran categorically denies these
accusations and asserts that the program is solely for civilian purposes.
In the last decade, several measures have been employed to curtail
Tehran’s nuclear drive. These include assassination of the country’s
nuclear scientists, cyberattacks, severe economic sanctions, and threats
of military strikes. It is difficult to assess the success (or failure) of each
of these measures. Rather, together, they suggest two conclusions. First,
Iran is paying a heavy price in human capital and economic prosperity.
Second, despite this heavy price, the Islamic Republic has continued to
make progress on its nuclear program. True, it can be argued that the
combination of these measures has slowed the progress, but it is also
true that the nuclear program in 2013 is more developed than it was
a few years ago. In other words, it is increasingly harder to sustain the
current confrontation without some kind of a breakthrough or, at least, a
gradual reduction of tension. Furthermore, despite Western powers’ suspicion, at present there is still consensus that an Iranian nuclear bomb is
neither imminent nor inevitable. The Iranian leaders have not made the
strategic decision to make the bomb and the country does not have all it
needs to make a nuclear device.
In short, there is time for diplomacy. Based on open sources, it is
difficult to determine if this time is long or short. Still, most parties in
this controversy appear to agree that diplomatic efforts have not yet
been completely exhausted. The uncertainty and unpredictability of a
military operation (limited or otherwise) further underscores the significance of a diplomatic solution. There is no way to predict with any
certainty that Iran and its international rivals would agree on a diplomatic outcome any time soon. Still, one can argue that major players
on both sides understand that other options are, for the time being,
more costly and less desirable. Finally, it is important to point out that
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pursuing diplomatic efforts does not mean suspending uranium enrichment or lifting economic sanctions. All parties are likely to retain all
their options until they reach an agreement. The goal is to pressure the
other side to comply with one’s demands.
Against this background, this article seeks to examine the American
and Iranian stances on the nuclear dispute and highlight the main characteristics of a potential diplomatic agreement between global powers
led by the United States and Iran. Again, reaching such an agreement
is by no means guaranteed. Still, the argument of this article is the differences between the two sides are not unbridgeable. In the following
sections, I examine the Iranian, American, and European stances on the
nuclear dispute. The goal is not to assess the rightness or wrongness of
each; rather, to understand Iran’s, the United States’, and the European
Union’s perceptions of themselves and the other powers. This will be
followed by a discussion of the main elements of a potential deal. The
underlying conclusion is the global powers, led by Washington, should
adopt a step-by-step approach with reciprocal actions. The policy
objective should be to establish a robust verification regime that simultaneously recognizes Iran’s right of peaceful nuclear power and provides
assurances to the international community that the Islamic Republic
will not build nuclear weapons.

Iran

It is important to note the process of policy formulation and decisionmaking in Tehran is very complicated. True, the Supreme Leader
Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei has the final word, but
it is also true several institutions and top officials play an active role. The
list includes the president, the heads of the legislative (Majlis) and judicial
branches, and a number of ministers and military leaders, among others.
In a speech inaugurating the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned
Movement on 30 August 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei highlighted Iran’s
stance on the nuclear confrontation.1 First, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear
drive relies largely on Articles IV and VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The former states, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted
as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
The latter says, “Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”2 This
means, according to Tehran, “nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons
for none.” First, the Iranian leaders claim their nuclear program is legitimate while the nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, United
Kingdom, France, and China) have not lived up to their NPT commitments. Second, Iranian officials have always accused Western powers of
a double standard in pressuring their country to give up its “legitimate”
nuclear rights while initially helping Israel to build nuclear weapons and
1     Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “Supreme Leader’s Inaugural Speech at the 16th Non-Aligned
Summit,” Iranian Students’ News Agency, August 30, 2012, http://isna.ir/en/news/91060905090/
Supreme-Leader-s-Inaugural-Speech-at-the.
2     United Nations, “The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” 2005
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), May 2-27,
2005, New York, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
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later avoiding any condemnation (Israel is widely believed to possess
nuclear weapons and has never signed the NPT).
Third, since the 1979 Islamic revolution several grand ayatollahs
have strongly spoken against the production, stockpiling, and use of
not only nuclear weapons but all types of weapons of mass destruction. They see these weapons as incompatible with Islam. Ayatollah
Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, suspended the nuclear
weapons program which the Shah started before the revolution. His successor, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious edict) in 1995 that
considered all weapons of mass destruction as a great and unforgivable
sin and declared them forbidden (haram).3 In order to prove that this
fatwa is a legal and binding document, the Iranian government submitted it to the United Nations in early 2013.
Fourth, Iran insists on its “right” to enrich uranium based on at
least two grounds: (a) there is a strong correlation between national pride
in the country’s scientific advances and the nuclear program. In other
words, the nuclear program is perceived as an embodiment of national
technological achievement. With the exception of Israel, Iran has the
most advanced nuclear program in the Middle East; (b) history teaches
Iran to reject dependency on foreign supplies of nuclear fuels. In 1973,
Eurodif was founded as a joint venture of Belgium, France, Iran, Italy,
and Spain. The Shah invested $1 billion in the company. This investment made Iran entitled to buy 10 percent of the enriched uranium
produced by Eurodif. Iran did not receive any enriched uranium and
after a long legal dispute was awarded reimbursement.4
Finally, and probably most important, Iranian leaders see the
nuclear dispute as part of a broader ideological and strategic conflict with
Western powers led by the United States. Ayatollah Khomeini famously
said the revolution was not about the “price of watermelon,” meaning
it was not driven by economic hardship. Rather, it was in response to
perceived American penetration of the Iranian nation and society. Thus,
resisting US influence has been a significant drive of Iranian policy since
1979. Iranian leaders believe that Washington’s real goal is not nuclear
limitation but “regime change” in Tehran.5 They argue the United States
never accepted the Islamic regime and since 1979 has adopted a confrontational approach even before the nuclear program became an issue.

United States

In the last two years, the United States’ energy outlook has tremendously improved due to impressive technological advances known as
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. The International Energy
Agency projects that the United States, which currently imports approximately 20 percent of its total energy needs, “will become self-sufficient

3     Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Ten Reasons Iran Doesn’t Want the Bomb,”
The National Interest, December 4, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/
ten-reasons-iran-doesnt-want-the-bomb-7802.
4     Oliver Meier, “Iran and Foreign Enrichment: A Troubled Model,” Arms Control Association,
January/February 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IranEnrich.
5     Ali Vaez and Charles D. Ferguson, “New Report: Towards Enhanced Safeguards for Iran’s
Nuclear Program,” Federation of American Scientists, October 6, 2011, http://www.fas.org/press/
news/2011/report_iran_nuclear_program.html.
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in net terms by 2030.”6 Strategically, this means the United States will
continue to be less dependent on oil and gas supplies from the Persian
Gulf region. This promising outlook has prompted some analysts and
policymakers to call for disengagement from the Middle East. This
argument, however, has at least a two-fold shortfall. First, the American
economy is by far the largest economy in the world. The global economy
is well-integrated; what happens in one region affects the rest. True, the
United States is growing less dependent on oil and gas supplies from
the Middle East, but China, India, Japan, and South Korea are moving
in the opposite direction. Second, in addition to energy interests in the
Persian Gulf region, Washington has broader geopolitical and strategic
interests, including the security of Israel, counterterrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In short, despite an improved
energy outlook the United States is highly unlikely to disengage from the
Middle East any time soon.
Against this background, the US concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear
program are multidimensional. A nuclear-armed Iran would pose an
existential threat to Israel. Tehran might give these weapons to terrorist organizations. Iran would become more aggressive, assertive, and
intimidate its neighbors. Finally, the argument goes, other neighbors,
particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would follow suit and
acquire their own nuclear weapons. It is important to point out there
is no consensus on these potential threats. Indeed, many current and
former policymakers and analysts have recently refuted these concerns
and offered the opposite argument.7
These arguments and counterarguments aside, the United States’
objective was clearly articulated by President Obama, “I do not have
a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”8 The President has also repeatedly stated there
remains time to pursue a diplomatic solution, but, time is not unlimited.
To prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb, different US administrations
have adopted a “carrot-and-stick” approach, employing a variety of
rewards and punishments. These include diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and keeping the military option open, among others.
Initially, the United States preferred not to talk directly to Iran
and encouraged the Europeans to take the lead. In his second term,
President Bush expressed dismay at what he termed the outsourcing
of our policy toward Iran. This option was reinforced in 2009 when
President Obama announced his willingness to talk to the Iranian leaders
to solve the nuclear dispute. In the following years, Undersecretaries for
Political Affairs William Burns and Wendy Sherman led the US delegation as part of the so-called 5+1 (the five permanent members in
the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) negotiations with
Iran. Little success, if any, came out of these negotiations. According to
Robert Hunter, a former US ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty
6     International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, http://www.iea.org.
7     For example, see Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 91, no.4
(July-August 2012): 2-10; Paul Pillar, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran,” Washington Monthly, March
2012, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com; and Reza Marashi, “America’s Real Iran Problem,” The
New York Times, November 10, 2011.
8     Barack Obama, “Transcript of Obama’s American-Israel Public Affairs Committee Speech,”
Politico,March 4, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html.
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Organization (NATO), the reason for failing to make real progress is
the negotiations “focused overwhelmingly on the nuclear file and on
‘technical’ arrangements, without going to core issues of security.”9 In
the first press conference following his reelection, President Obama
stated he will push for a dialogue and a diplomatic solution.
Iran has been under various economic sanctions since 1979. In the
last few years, President Obama succeeded in enlisting support of sanctions from many countries and the United Nations Security Council. It
is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the full impact of these
sanctions. Still, economic and geopolitical facts draw a mixed picture.
Despite holding some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the
world, Iran’s volumes of production and export have fallen since early
2012. In March 2013, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported
that Iran’s maximum sustainable crude production capacity is off by
700,000 barrels a day.10 High oil prices have encouraged exploration and
production in most oil-producing countries. Meanwhile, some of the
major international oil companies have suspended operations in Iran.
In the long run, however, some doubt the effectiveness of these sanctions. Having lived under sanctions for more than three decades, Iran
has learned to mitigate their impact. Furthermore, as Paul Stevens—a
leading oil expert—argues, oil embargoes simply do not work. The
international oil market is “too complex, with too many players and
too many options to disguise transactions.”11 Stevens cites examples
of failed oil embargoes such as Cuba; Rhodesia and South Africa; the
Arab oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; and the
embargo against Iraq in the 1990s.
There is no doubt these comprehensive and severe economic sanctions have seriously hurt Iran’s economy as demonstrated by the massive
drop in the country’s currency and its oil production and export. In
a speech in the holy city of Mashhad to mark the beginning of the new
Iranian year (21 March 2013), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei acknowledged
the banking and oil sanctions have hurt Iran. It is important, however,
not to underestimate Tehran’s ability to mitigate their impact in the long
term. Some Iranians argue that the country confronted much harder circumstances during the 1980-88 war with Iraq than under any sanctions
Western powers can impose. Finally, how far sanctions can impede the
nuclear program is uncertain. Sanctions are clearly increasing the price
Iran pays to maintain its nuclear program. However, despite the high and
mounting price, there are no indications of change in the country’s nuclear
policy. In June 2010, commenting on economic sanctions, then Director
of Central Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta said, “Will it deter them
from their ambitions with regard to nuclear capability? Probably not.”12
President Obama, like his predecessor President Bush, has repeatedly
stated that a military option will be considered if diplomacy and sanctions
9     Robert E. Hunter, “Rethinking Iran,” Survival 52, no.5 (October-November 2010): 135-156,
151.
10     International Energy Agency, “Oil Market Report,” http://www.iea.org.
11     Paul Stevens, “An Embargo on Iranian Crude Oil Exports: How Likely and with What
Impact?” Chatham House, January 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/
view/181293.
12     Leon Panetta, “This Week Transcript: Panetta,” interview by Jake Tapper, ABC News
This Week with George Stephanopoulis,” June 27, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/
week-transcript-panetta/story?id=11025299&page=1.
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fail to prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons. It is highly speculative
to predict the shape of such an option (i.e., a limited strike on nuclear
installations or a broader attack on centers of power). What is certain,
however, is several factors would weigh on the decision to attack Iran.
These include the short- and long-term impact on the nuclear program;
stability in Iran and the broader Middle East; Tehran’s potential retaliatory options; and the reaction of global oil markets among others. In late
2012, a group of highly influential former diplomats, members in the
Congress, and military leaders published a report called The Iran Project in
which they urged the United States’ administration to consider all these
issues before making a decision to attack Iran.13 Raising doubt about the
credibility of a military option, Michael Hayden, former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, stated, “Attacking Iran would guarantee
what we are trying to prevent—an Iran that will spare nothing to build
a nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.”14
Finally, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, wars take a
life of their own and it is much easier to start a war than to end it.
Underscoring these points, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told
an audience of West Point cadets, “In my opinion, any future defense
secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land
army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head
examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”15
To conclude, US administrations have considered economic sanctions and potential military action as means to pressure Iran to engage
in diplomatic efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to the nuclear
issue. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Undersecretary William Burns stated, “Sanctions and pressure are not
an end in themselves; they are a complement, not a substitute, for the
diplomatic solution.”16

European Union

The goal of the European Union’s policy on Iran’s nuclear dispute
is to “achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement which
restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
the Iranian nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s legitimate right
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.”17 This declared objective is not different from that of the
United States. Brussels, however, had initially adopted a different tactic
than Washington. Since the early days of the 1979 revolution, relations
between Washington and Tehran have been dominated by mutual hostility and mistrust. The United States has sought to isolate and contain
Iran. On the other side, the Europeans have taken a less confrontational
approach and sought to influence Iran’s domestic and foreign policies by engaging the country in commercial and diplomatic relations.
13     The Iran Project, Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran (New York: The Iran
Project, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf.
14     Ken Dilanian, “U.S. Intelligence Chief Sees Limited Benefit in an Attack on Iran,” Los Angeles
Times, February 16, 2012.
15     Thom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan,” The New York Times,
February 25, 2011.
16     William J. Burns, “Implementing Tougher Sanctions on Iran: A Progress Report,”
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, December 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/p/us/
rm/2010/152222.htm.
17     Council of the European Union Factsheet, The European Union and Iran (Brussels, Belgium:
March 12, 2013), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/129724.pdf.
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Stated differently, the Americans played the role of “bad cop” while the
Europeans played the role of “good cop.” Eventually the two roles converged and neither has succeeded. Iran has continued to make progress
on its nuclear program.
The difference between American and European policies on Iran
can be explained by historical, commercial, and geopolitical factors.
Generally, Tehran has had warmer relations with some European countries than with the United States. The European Union has been Iran’s
major trade partner for many years with Iran exporting a large portion
of its oil and petroleum products to European markets in return for
machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals.18 Finally, Iran and the
broader Persian Gulf/Middle East region are in Europe’s backyard—
what happens there has a deeper and direct impact on Europe than on
the United States. These differences between Washington and Brussels,
as well as some differences among the European Union (EU) memberstates, have provided Iran with opportunities to overcome attempts to
isolate and weaken its international economic and political outreach.
Against this background Tehran and Brussels sought to establish
cooperative relations in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).
These efforts, however, were restrained by disagreements over the fatwa
(religious ruling) against Salman Rushdie and allegations of Iranian
involvement in terrorist activities. Despite these obstacles and setbacks,
the Iranian and European sides initiated the so-called “critical dialogue,”
which later evolved into a comprehensive one. The Europeans sought
to use growing trade and commercial ties as well as flourishing political
dialogue to change Iran’s policy in four areas: human rights, the ArabIsrael conflict, allegations of sponsoring terrorism, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Gradually, the nuclear issue
dominated relations between the two sides, particularly since the early
2000s when more information on the nuclear program became available.
The revelation of previously undeclared nuclear activities in 2002
was coupled with two other developments. First, the EU became more
concerned about the proliferation of WMD and articulated a broad
strategy signaling a rising European role. This strategy was officially
declared in the mid-2000s.19 Second, the United States’ invasion of Iraq
in 2003 heightened tension in the Middle East. Europe was concerned
that Washington might start another war against Iran, which would
further destabilize its “backyard.”
The combination of all these developments laid the foundation for
European-Iranian nuclear negotiation. These diplomatic efforts were
led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and started in 2003.
In the following year, Javier Solana, then the EU high representative
for common foreign and security policy, joined the negotiations. In
November 2004, the Europeans and Iranians signed an accord known
as the Paris Agreement under which Tehran agreed to suspend uranium
enrichment and the E3/EU recognized that the suspension was a
18     European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Countries and Regions: Iran, http://
ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm.
19     Council of the European Union, EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Brussels, Belgium: The European Council, 12 December 2003), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2004/august/tradoc_118532.en03.pdf.
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voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation.20 This
Agreement did not last for a long time. The two sides accused each other
of not living up to their commitments.
Following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
2005, Tehran resumed enriching uranium and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) referred Iran to the United Nations Security
Council. In 2006 and 2008, Solana presented offers for a negotiated
solution that included several economic and diplomatic incentives.21
These incentives, however, fell short of Iran’s expectations and demands.
Within this context the United Nations Security Council issued four
resolutions (1737 of December 2006, 1747 of March 2007, 1803 of March
2008, and 1929 of June 2010). These resolutions imposed strict and comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran. In parallel, the European Union
added extra sanctions. Meanwhile, the negotiating track has not been
completely abandoned. High Representative Catherine Ashton has led
several rounds of negotiations with Iran in what became known as the
5+1 or E3+3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and
the United States).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief European-Iranian
nuclear negotiation history. First, since the late 2000s the European
policy on Iran’s nuclear power has moved closer to the US stance, what
the Iranians perceive as “less carrots and more sticks.” Second, a major
reason for failing to reach tangible progress is the EU’s inability to address
a major Iranian concern—security. Iranian leaders perceive the nuclear
dispute as a pretext for regime change. The United States is better positioned than the EU to offer security guarantees to the Islamic Republic.

Potential Diplomatic Deal

Shortly after his reelection, President Obama highlighted the basic
elements of a negotiated deal, “There should be a way in which they
(the Iranians) can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their
obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that they’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon.”22 After three rounds
of negotiations with little success, Iran and the global powers held a
new round of talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in late February. No official

20     International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme, Mehr News
Agency, November 14, 2004, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/eu_iran14112004.
shtml.
21     Walter Posch, “Iran and the European Union,” The Iran Primer (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, October 11, 2010), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/
iran-and-european-union.
22     Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in a News Conference,” The White
House, November 14, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/14/
remarks-president-news-conference.
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account was given of offers and counteroffers. It was reported, however,
that negotiations focused on several points:
•• Suspending Iran’s uranium enrichment at 20 percent purity, which is
considered near weapons grade.
•• Restricting Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.
•• Freezing enrichment at the underground Fordo site, near Qom.
•• Increasing the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activity.
•• Cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in a more transparent manner.
•• Recognizing Iran’s legitimate rights to enrich uranium.
•• Pledging not to impose new sanctions and gradual removal of existing
ones.
The two sides agree on a number of issues but there are fundamental differences regarding the sequence of actions and the timing and
magnitude of sanctions relief. Thus, it is important not to exaggerate
the relatively positive outcome of this latest round of negotiation. Still,
the Iranian negotiators issued a statement underscoring they “consider
these talks a positive step which could be completed by taking a positive
and constructive approach and taking reciprocal steps.”23 Iran and the
global powers convened a meeting of experts in Istanbul (March 2013)
and another meeting of top negotiators in Almaty (April 2013). How
much they can agree on, if any, would be determined by their negotiating strategies and, more importantly, by economic, political, military,
and strategic facts on the ground.

The Way Ahead

The next several months appear crucial in addressing Iran’s nuclear
program. On one side, the country continues to make progress, including developing the skills and proficiencies of enriching uranium. On the
other side, severe economic sanctions have inflicted economic hardship,
reduced oil exports, and brought economic growth to a standstill. The
legitimacy and survival of any regime depends on its ability to meet the
basic needs of its population. Both Iran and global powers claim that
time is on their side. These claims and counterclaims aside, it is certain
that a diplomatic solution would serve the two countries’, and the entire
world’s, interests. Moving forward, Iranian, American, and European
negotiators should consider the following:
First, after more than three decades of hostility, the two sides
should have realistic expectations and limit negotiations to the nuclear
issue. Other significant strategic grievances and disagreements need to
be addressed; however, in the current environment, a grand bargain
seems highly unlikely. Instead, an agreement to defuse tension over the
nuclear stalemate can prepare the foundation for confidence-building
and encourage both sides to consider other issues. The negotiations to
address the nuclear issue are not only technical; political and strategic
concerns are equally important.
23     Fars News Agency, “Iranian Negotiators Issue Statement after Talks with World Powers
in Kazakhstan,” February 27, 2013, http://english.farsnews.com/printable.php?nn=9107148304.
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Second, since the 1979 revolution, Iran has had a unique political/
religious system based on the concept of velayat-e faqih (guardianship
of the religious jurist). A close examination of the Iranian leaders’
statements and policies illustrates regime survival is their overriding
concern.24 Indeed, regime survival is at the core of the nuclear dispute.
Many Iranian leaders believe the United States is using the nuclear issue
as a pretext to pursue regime change. They make the point that when
the nuclear program started under the Shah, the United States supported
it, sold nuclear reactors to Tehran, and provided education and training
to Iranians. They claim that Washington’s real goal is to change the
Islamic regime in Tehran, not the nuclear program. Ayatollah Khamenei
recently stated, “If the Americans want the issue to be over, there is one
simple solution which is the US should put aside its enmity with the
Iranian nation.”25 This perception needs to be addressed. US officials
need to assure their Iranian counterparts that the US goal is to change
Iranian policy not the regime.
Third, if the negotiators reach an agreement, they will have to convince the public and political leaders in Washington and Tehran to accept
it. The public perception on both sides is extremely hostile. For more than
three decades, Iran has been seen as the major threat to US interests in
the Middle East and South Asia and the United States has been portrayed
as the “Great Satan.” Leaders on both sides need to fundamentally alter
these perceptions. Major initiatives to build confidence are needed.
Finally, the decades-long enmity between Washington and Tehran
obscures the fact that American and Iranian interests are not always
mutually exclusive. There are several areas of potential and promising cooperation including energy, counterterrorism, drug trafficking,
regional security, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others. An AmericanIranian rapprochement is not only possible, but desirable. It would serve
the interests of both sides and contribute to regional and global stability. On the Iranian New Year’s Eve (Nowruz), President Obama sent
a congratulatory message to the Iranian people and leaders saying he
would “continue to work toward a new day between our two nations that
bears the fruit of friendship and peace.”26 In late March 2013, Ayatollah
Khamenei said he is not optimistic about talks with the United States,
but not opposed to them either. These statements suggest a breakthrough is not likely and key strategic and psychological hurdles need to
be addressed. Still, a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and
reducing tension between Washington and Tehran is worth the effort.

24     James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible?” International
Security 37, no.3 (Winter 2012/13): 52-91, 60.
25     Mehr News Agency, “Iran will raze Israel to ground in war: Ayatollah Khamenei,” March 21,
2013, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-323156125.html.
26     Barack Obama, “President Obama’s Nowruz Message to the Iranian People,” The White
House, March 18, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/03/15/
president-obama-s-nowruz-message-iranian-people.

